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Abstract
This paper evaluates the impacts of education on women’s relational empowerment, within
a context of 70 developing countries across the world. Exploiting the variation in educa-
tional attainment between biological sisters, we find that education is positively associated
with women’s intra-household decision making authority in both financial and non-financial
domains. Moreover, education reduces relational friction, especially women’s exposure to
psychological abuse. Our mechanism analyses provide suggestive evidence that these im-
provements could be attributed to increased access to information, assortative matching, and
better labor market outcome.
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1 Introduction
Empowering women is one of the key themes in the Agenda for Sustainable Development
adopted by the United Nations in 2015 (UN Women, 2018). Women’s empowerment is a
multi-faceted concept which refers to a process of change where women gain the freedom to
control their own lives in a way that improves their well-being. In a comprehensive review,
Huis et al. (2017) integrate previous findings and classifies women’s empowerment into three
dimensions, namely, personal, relational, and societal empowerment. In this paper, we focus
on relational empowerment which refers to women’s position in relation to partner, family,
or social networks, such as intra-household decision making and experiences of intimate
partner violence (Rahman, 1999; Banerjee et al., 2015; Huis et al., 2019).1 The relational
dimension is of interest because women continue to lag behind men in personal autonomy in
both developed and developing countries. The poorer the countries, the less likely the women
are to influence household decisions, and the more likely they are to face domestic violence
(Jayachandran, 2015).
In this paper, we investigate the extent to which education improves women’s relational
empowerment. The contribution of our study is threefold. First, we analyze the non-pecuniary
effects of education on an important yet understudied aspect in economic development
(women’s empowerment), while the majority of existing studies tend to focus on the returns
of education in financial or human capital domains. In particular, we comprehensively
evaluate the impacts of education on women’s empowerment in the relational dimension
indicated by intra-household decision making power and relational friction. Second, instead
of concentrating on one individual country, we study the relationship of interest for a wide
coverage of 70 developing countries from 1992 to 2018. The wide coverage across time and
space lends external validity to our estimates. In other words, the results of our study
could be generalized to many countries. Third, we rigorously examine potential mechanisms
through which education empowers women. Understanding the pathways is important to
devise policies to improve the well-being of women.
Employing the Demographic and Health Surveys, we uncover the positive impacts of education
1 Personal empowerment is related to self-esteem, control beliefs, self-confidence, and self-efficacy (Basargekar,
2009; Kato and Kratzer, 2013; Hansen, 2015). Societal empowerment reflects women’s position in society
on a macro level, for instance, the proportion of female leadership or the percentage of parliamentary seats
held by women (Strøm et al., 2014; Huis et al., 2017).
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on women’s empowerment along the line of intra-household decision making authority.
Specifically, an additional year of education is associated with an increase in the composite
decision indices (both Financial Decisions and Non-financial Decisions) by approximately
0.01 points. We also find some evidence that a one-year increase in female education
reduces relational friction, particularly women’s exposure to psychological abuse by the
husband/partner by 0.01 points. To put the numbers into perspective, a woman with a college
degree is likely to have higher intra-household decision making authority and less relational
friction by 16 percentage points than a woman without education (corresponding to 30%
and 87% of the means, respectively). Our mechanism analysis provides suggestive evidence
that the empowerment effects of female education could be, at least in part, attributed to
increased access to information, assortative matching, and better labor market outcome.
Given the integral role of women in the Sustainable Development Goals (UN Women, 2018),
our findings call for expanding access to education for women as part of the solution.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews related literature. Section 3 presents
the empirical methodology. Section 4 describes the data. Section 5 provides the results,
robustness checks, and heterogeneity analyses. Section 6 concludes our paper.
2 Literature Review
Conceptually, our study on the link between education and women’s relational empowerment
can be related to the bargaining theories of distribution within the household, such as the
works of Manser and Brown (1980), McElroy and Horney (1981), and Lundberg and Pollak
(1993). These models treat household decision as a cooperative game in which a woman
and her partner resolve their differences by the bargaining solution (e.g. Nash). Unlike the
unitary model where decisions are made by perfectly aligned preferences, these bargaining
models focus on household demand behavior that depends on the resources controlled by each
partner both individually and jointly. By raising women’s knowledge and economic resources,
education serves as a “threat” option to a non-cooperative equilibrium that increases women’s
bargaining power within households. Here, the “threat” option reflects the outcome that
would be obtained in the absence of agreement. In other words, it captures the individuals’
maximal levels of utility outside the household. The more attractive a woman’s opportunities
outside the household, the more power the woman will have in the intra-household decision
making. Simply put, education could empower women by raising their welfare/gains in
a non-cooperative scenario with their partners, thus allowing them to bargain with their
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partners on household resource allocation. Therefore, education is regarded by UNESCO
(2014) as an important instrument to empower women worldwide.
Empirically, our paper is closely related to studies on the empowerment effects of female
education. Particularly, within the context of Kenya, Friedman et al. (2016) show that
increased secondary school enrollment decreases women’s acceptance of the right of men to
beat their wives and reduces the likelihood of parents choosing husbands for their daughters.
The authors conclude that education fosters a desire for autonomy and empowerment. In
the same vein, Cannonier and Mocan (2018) find that education makes Sierra Leonean
women more likely to declare that a wife is justified in refusing sex when she is tired or when
the husband has a sexually transmitted disease. Educated women also tend to assert that
the violent practice of female genital mutilation should be stopped. While an increase in
educational accumulation makes women less likely to be tolerant of intimate partner violence
as well as other harmful practices conflicting with their welfare, Samarakoon and Parinduri
(2015) does not detect any effect of education on women’s decision-making power within
households in Indonesia.
Our study also fits into the literature on the determinants of women’s relational empowerment.
For example, incomes and ownership of land are positively linked with female autonomy
within the household proxied by a woman’s say in household decision making (Panda and
Agarwal, 2005; Allendorf, 2007; Harari, 2019; Heath and Tan, 2019). Moreover, access to
microfinance services empowers women through raising their decision making power (Pitt
et al., 2006; Ashraf et al., 2010; Li et al., 2011; Alam, 2012) as well as reducing domestic
violence (Hashemi et al., 1996; Panda and Agarwal, 2005; Arora and Arora, 2012).
There remain three gaps in the literature. First, despite being regarded as one of the
Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) by the United Nations, women’s empowerment has
received insufficient attention, and the role of education in empowering women has been
understudied. Second, among the few studies on the empowering effects of education, the
evidence is conflicting as some studies document positive impacts (Cannonier and Mocan,
2018; Friedman et al., 2016) while others point to the non-existence of such a relationship
(Samarakoon and Parinduri., 2015). To fill these two gaps, this paper aims to investigate
the impacts of education and women’s empowerment measured by women’s intra-household
decision making power and relational friction. In terms of identification, we establish a
causal link on the relationship of interest by exploiting the variation in education among
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biological sisters within a fixed effects framework. Finally, prior studies only consider the role
of education in empowering women for one single country, thus making it hard to interpret
the results as externally valid. To this end, we employ a global sample of 70 developing
countries spanning from 1992 to 2018 to estimate the empowering effects of education. The
wide coverage across time and space lend external validity to our results.
3 Empirical Methodology
The relationship between education and women’s empowerment can be expressed by the
following model,
Yict = β0 + β1Educationict +X
′
ict
Ω + ǫict (1)
where the subscripts i, c, and t refer to woman, country, and survey year, respectively. Yict
represents different measures of relational empowerment (described in details in Section 4).
Educationict is the educational attainment of the woman. X
′
ict
is a covariate vector including
age, place of residence, ethnicity as well as the country-specific birth cohort trend. We denote
by ǫict the error term. Standard errors are clustered at the country level.
The coefficient of interest is β1, which summarizes the empowering effects of female education.
In this model, we compare the empowerment measures of women randomly drawn from the
population who attain different levels of education. Estimates from equation (1) are plagued
with heterogeneity bias since there are unobserved family characteristics that jointly determine
educational attainment and empowerment measures. For example, a high socioeconomic
status family might adopt a liberal view and instill the value of women’s empowerment
to their daughter. That family is also more likely to invest in the schooling of their child.
In other words, unobserved family traits may simultaneously influence both educational
attainment and women’s empowerment, confounding the causal relationship of interest.
We attempt to control for unobserved heterogeneity in family characteristics by comparing
the empowerment outcomes of two biological sisters. As the sister comparison will better
capture the effects of unobserved family traits than other comparison groups (Geronimus and
Korenman, 1992), the method is widely adopted in prior studies to account for unobserved
heterogeneity in family background (Altonji and Dunn, 1996; Aaronson, 1997; Currie and
Stabile, 2006; Fletcher and Wolfe, 2008; Fletcher, 2010; Le and Nguyen, 2020a). In our
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context, the between-sister comparison is given in the sister fixed effects model as follows,
Yisct = β0 + β1Educationisct + λs +X
′
isct
Ω + ǫisct (2)
where the subscript s refers to the sister group. A woman and her biological sister(s) together
form a unique set s. The term λs stands for sister fixed effects which can remove confounding
unobserved endowments common to biological sisters. Factors such as unmeasured family
traits that could potentially affect both empowerment outcomes and education are now
accounted for in the sister fixed effects model. The covariate X ′
isct
now consists of age and
the age difference between the woman and her sister.2
The coefficient of interest is β1, which captures the weighted average of the differences
in empowerment measures of two biological sisters where the woman attains one more
educational year than her sister. Our identification of the impacts of education on women’s
empowerment hinges upon the variation in educational attainment between sisters. The
underlying identifying assumption is that the educational differences between sisters are as
good as random. To provide suggestive evidence on the plausibility of this assumption, we test
whether the educational differences between sisters are correlated with other characteristics.
Following Altonji and Dunn (1996), we regress the deviation from (sister) pair mean of the
woman’s years of education on the deviation from (sister) pair mean of the woman’s prior
characteristics. These characteristics include birth order, childhood place of residence (an
indicator for a city), and the time interval between marriage and first birth. The results
presented in Table A1 suggest that the educational differences between sisters are uncorrelated
with other characteristics, thus further strengthening our empirical strategy.
4 Data
The data used in this paper comes from the Woman File of the Demographic and Health
Surveys (DHS). Respondents are women aged 15-49. The DHS Woman includes information
on demographics, education, and employment, among others. Especially, there are various
questions which can be used to assess women’s empowerment in the DHS, making it ideal
for the purpose of this study. We pool the data and impose several restrictions to construct
the analysis sample. First, we only utilize countries and data waves with available women
2 As we later show in Section 4, since our identification comes from the between-sister variation in educational
attainment, our sample consists of sisters who live together. Therefore, the inclusion of sister fixed effects
will absorb the place of residence of the woman.
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empowerment measures. Second, we further limit ourselves to women aged 18 and older to
confine the effects of education at completed schooling (McCrary and Royer, 2011). Finally,
because our identification comes from the comparison between sisters with different years
of education, we construct a sample made up of sister groups. Specifically, the biological
daughters of the household head constitute the first group of sisters. The second group of
sisters consists of women who are biological sisters of the household head and the head herself.
These restrictions leave us with over 23,000 women in 70 developing countries. The list of
countries is provided in Table B1 in appendix B. Table B1 also provides the survey year and
wave, average educational attainment, and age for each country in our sample.
Intra-household Decision Making − Women’s intra-household decision making power
measures are drawn from seven item questions where women were asked to specify the
decision-maker(s) in the following categories: spending of their own earnings, spending of
their husband/partner’s earnings, making large household purchases, making household
purchases for daily needs, their own health care, visits to family/relatives, and foods to
be cooked each day. Based on women’s responses, those decisions can be made alone or
jointly by the women and their husbands/partners. To capture women’s decision power in
the household, we construct a composite index as follows. We first assign 0, 0.5, and 1 point
for each domain if the woman has no say in the decision, if she is partially involved in the
decision, and if she is the sole decision-maker, respectively.3 Then we take the average of the
underlying items.
Using this method, we construct two female decision-making power indices. First, the
Financial Decisions index is based on four items, namely, spending of own earnings, spending
of husband/partner’s earnings, making large household purchases, and making household
purchases for daily needs. Second, the Non-financial Decisions index is constructed from
the three remaining items, including the woman’s health care, visits to family/relatives,
and everyday cooking. Our measures of female intra-household decision making power have
Cronbach’s alpha greater than 0.7, suggesting that the items underlying the indices are
measuring a single concept.
Relational Friction − Relational friction is measured by women’s experience of two types
of domestic violence: physical violence and psychological abuse. Accordingly, we construct
3 This choice of assignment is adopted in Huis et al. (2019).
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two indices to measure women’s exposure to relational friction. For each item, we assign
the value of 1 if the woman ever experiences the incident and 0 otherwise. We respectively
compute a composite index by averaging across the underlying items under each measure
(Physical Violence and Psychological Abuse).
To reflect women’s experience with physical violence, we draw from women-reported frequency
of facing these six incidents: being pushed, shook, or had something thrown at, being slapped,
being punched with fists or something harmful, being kicked or dragged, being strangled or
burned, having arm twisted or hair pulled, all by the husband/partner. To assess women’s
exposure to psychological abuse, we utilize three items on the frequency of being humiliated,
being threatened with harm, and being insulted/felt bad by the husband/partner. The
internal reliability of the two relational friction indices is high evidenced by a large Cronbach’s
alpha.
Table 1: Summary Statistics
Mean SD Observations
Panel A: Controls
Education 7.533 4.640 23,894
Age 27.829 7.099 23,894
Age Differential 6.309 4.720 23,894
Panel B: Outcomes
Financial Decisions 0.541 0.361 23,894
Non-financial Decisions 0.542 0.336 20,037
Physical Violence 0.146 0.255 6,052
Psychological Abuse 0.183 0.336 5,119
Panel A of Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics of control variables used in this analysis.
On average, a woman completes 7.5 years of education. The mean values of the woman’s age
and the age differences between the woman and her sister are 27.8 and 6.3 years, respectively.
Panel B of Table 1 presents the mean and standard deviation of different measures of women’s
empowerment. Regarding intra-household decision making power, the Financial Decisions
and Non-financial Decisions indices take the mean values of 0.54. In terms of relational
friction, on average, Physical Violence and Psychological Abuse indices lie at 0.15 and 0.18
points, respectively. Summary statistics of the underlying items are provided in Table B2 in
the Appendix.
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5 Results
5.1 Main Results
Intra-household Decision Making − We provide the estimates for the impacts of educa-
tion on women’s intra-household decision making authority in Table 2. It is evident from
Panel A that education makes women more likely to be involved in household decisions.
Specifically, an additional year of education raises women’s decision making authority in
financial and non-financial domains (proxied by the Financial Decisions and Non-financial
Decisions indices, respectively) by approximately 0.01 points.
Table 2: The Impacts of Female Education on Intra-household Decision Making
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Decision Indices
Financial Non-financial
Decisions Decisions
Female Education 0.009∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.002)
Observations 23,894 20,037
Panel B: Financial Decision Items
Large Daily Own Husband/Partner
Purchases Purchases Earnings Earnings
Female Education 0.011∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ 0.001 0.003
(0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003)
Observations 20,004 12,723 13,417 10,068
Panel C: Non-financial Decision Items
Women’s Food Family
Health Care Cooked Visits
Female Education 0.013∗∗∗ 0.003∗ 0.008∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Observations 19,927 10,720 19,924
NOTE: Each cell reports the coefficient β1 in equation (2). All regressions control for age, the age
difference between the woman and her sister, sister fixed effects, as well as the country-specific birth
cohort trend. Standard errors are provided in the parentheses. ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
It is suggested that women’s bargaining power in male-dominated domains that involves major
financial decisions differs from the engagement of women in traditionally female-dominated
domains (Dutt et al., 2016; Johnson, 2017). To shed additional light on the source of the
increase in women’s decision making authority, we separately estimate the effects of education
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on each of the item decisions that constitute the decision making indices.4 As shown in Panel
B of Table 2, education increases women’s decision making on both large household purchases
and household purchases for daily needs. Moreover, education is positively associated with
women’s decision making authority in their own health care as well as other traditionally
female-dominated domains such as everyday cooking and visits to family/relatives. However,
there is not enough statistical evidence for the effects of education on the spending of own
earnings and husband/partner’s earnings.5 Overall, the improvements in decision making
authority within the households come from women’s increased involvements in decisions on
large and daily household purchases, decisions regarding their own health care as well as
other traditionally female-dominated categories.
Taken together, the results in Table 2 suggest that education empowers women in terms of
their intra-household decision making power. Our findings are consistent with the bargaining
theory proposed by Manser and Brown (1980) where education allows women to enjoy higher
bargaining power within households. Particularly, the more educated women command more
knowledge and make more financial contributions to the family, thus are more likely to
have a say in household decisions regarding resource allocation (Lundberg and Pollak, 1993;
Chiappori et al., 2009; Duflo, 2012). However, our results differ from those in Samarakoon
and Parinduri (2015) which document that education does not have any effect on women’s
decision making authority.
Relational Friction − Table 3 presents the estimated impacts of education on relational
friction. Relational friction is measured by the extent to which women are exposed to physical
and psychological aggression by their husbands/partners, proxied by the Physical Violence
and the Psychological Abuse indices. As shown in Column 1 of Panel A, there is a negative
association between female education and the incidence of physical violence. The estimated
effect is marginally significant with p-value equal to 0.11. In terms of psychological abuse
(Column 2 of Panel A), we detect a negative association between female education and the
Psychological Abuse index. The estimate is statistically distinguishable from zero.
4 The seven items include Large Purchases, Daily Purchases, Own Earnings, Husband/Partner Earnings,
Women’s Health Care, Food Cooked, Family Visits. Each takes the value of 1 if the woman is the sole
decision maker, 0.5 if she is partially involved in the decision, 0 if she has no say in the decision.
5 Splitting the samples by continent, place of residence, marital status, employment status leaves the results
unchanged (Table A2). Specifically, we continue to find no effect of women’s education on decisions
regarding own earnings and husband/partner’s earnings for African and non-African women, rural and
urban women, married and unmarried women, as well as employed and unemployed women.
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In Panel B, we look at the six items that constitute the Physical Violence index, including
Being Pushed, Being Slapped, Being Punched, Being Kicked, Being Strangled, and Being
Twisted. These are dummy variables indicating whether the husband/partner ever uses a
particular type of violence against his wife. As evident from Panel B of Table 3, an additional
year of education decreases the incidence of the woman being slapped, punched, and strangled
by her husband/partner by 0.8, 0.8, and 0.5 percentage points, respectively. For other types
of domestic violence, the coefficient estimates are statistically insignificant.
In Panel C of Table 3, we further break down the Psychological Abuse index by looking
at the three underlying items (Being Humiliated, Being Threatened with Harm, and Being
Insulted). We find that more educated women are less likely to be insulted by their spouses
(Column 3). Education does not seem to affect the incidence of being humiliated and being
threatened. Overall, Table 3 suggests that education decreases relational friction in terms of
psychological abuse but leaves no effect on the incidence of physical violence. This finding is
in line with the literature on the inverse relationship between female education and domestic
violence (Eswaran and Malhotra, 2011; Anderberg et al., 2016).
Table 3: The Impacts of Female Education on Relational Friction
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Relational Friction Indices
Physical Psychological
Violence Abuse
Female Education -0.004 -0.009∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.003)
Observations 6,052 5,119
Panel B: Physical Violence Items
Being Being Being Being Being Being
Pushed Slapped Punched Kicked Strangled Twisted
Female Education 0.001 -0.008∗∗∗ -0.008∗∗∗ 0.001 -0.005∗∗∗ 0.002
(0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.007)
Observations 6,051 5,721 5,720 5,808 5,867 3,777
Panel C: Psychological Abuse Items
Being Being Being
Humiliated Threatened Insulted
Female Education 0.000 -0.089 -0.008∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.057) (0.001)
Observations 4,128 3,945 4,380
NOTE: Each cell reports the coefficient β1 in equation (2). All regressions control for age, the age
difference between the woman and her sister, sister fixed effects, as well as the country-specific birth
cohort trend. Standard errors are provided in the parentheses. ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
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5.2 Robustness Checks
In this section, we conduct three sets of exercises to test for the robustness of our results. In
the first set of exercises, we re-estimate our main model for samples of sisters with various
age gaps. Recall that our estimated effects of female education come from the comparison
of empowerment measures of biological sisters who attain different numbers of educational
years. The rationale behind the first set of robustness exercises is that the closer in ages
are the sisters, the more comparable they are. If the results for sisters close in age are
similar to the results in Tables 2 and 3, then our estimated impacts of education on women’s
relational empowerment are reliable. In the second set of exercises, we alter our measure of
decision making power indices. In the third set of exercises, we test for the robustness of our
results to different specifications. Particularly, we utilize survey weight, control for different
additional variables that could affect women’s empowerment, exclude all control variables.
The preservation of the estimates in both statistical and economic senses will strengthen our
results.
Table 4: Robustness Checks 1: Sisters with Different Age Gaps
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Financial Non-financial Physical Psychological
Decisions Decisions Violence Abuse
Panel A: Age difference ≤ 10 years
Female Education 0.009∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ -0.006 -0.009
(0.001) (0.001) (0.006) (0.013)
Observations 19,651 16,427 4,864 4,094
Panel B: Age difference ≤ 5 years
Female Education 0.007∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ -0.006 -0.013
(0.002) (0.002) (0.008) (0.018)
Observations 12,456 10,380 3,019 2,530
Panel C: Age difference ≤ 3 years
Female Education 0.006∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ -0.010 -0.004
(0.002) (0.002) (0.012) (0.028)
Observations 7,658 6,334 1,869 1,563
NOTE: Each cell reports the coefficient β1 in equation (2). All regressions control for age, the age
difference between the woman and her sister, sister fixed effects, as well as the country-specific birth
cohort trend. Standard errors are provided in the parentheses. ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
Robustness Checks 1: Sisters with Different Age Gaps − In this first set of exercises,
we re-estimate the impacts of education for samples of sisters with small age gaps and report
the estimating results in Table 4. Although the estimates are more internally valid when
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we narrow the age gaps between sisters, there is a loss of efficiency since we lose a lot of
observations. We look at sisters born up to 10, 5, and 3 years apart in Panel A, B, and
C, respectively.6 Female schooling has positive and significant impacts on decision making
authority in both financial and non-financial domains. The magnitudes of the impacts are
similar and somewhat larger than those in the main results. Female education is negatively
associated with both Physical Violence and Psychological Abuse indices. Despite the lack of
statistical power, the results do not indicate the absence of an actual effect (Amrheim et al.,
2019). Collectively, these robustness exercises lend some support to our estimated impacts of
education on women’s empowerment along the dimension of intra-household decision making
power.
Table 5: Robustness Checks 2: Different Measures of Intra-household Decision Making
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Decision Indices
Financial Non-financial
Decisions Decisions
Female Education 0.008∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.002)
Observations 23,894 20,037
Panel B: Financial Decision Items
Large Daily Own Husband
Purchases Purchases Earnings Earnings
Female Education 0.009∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.001 -0.000
(0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003)
Observations 20,004 12,723 13,417 10,068
Panel C: Non-financial Decision Items
Women’s Food Family
Health Care Cooked Visits
Female Education 0.014∗∗∗ 0.003 0.007∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
Observations 19,927 10,720 19,924
NOTE: Each cell reports the coefficient β1 in equation (2). All regressions control for age, the age
difference between the woman and her sister, sister fixed effects, as well as the country-specific birth
cohort trend. Standard errors are provided in the parentheses. ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
Robustness Checks 2: Different Measure of Intra-household Decision Making −
Recall that the items underlying the decision indices take the value of 0, 0.5, and 1 if the
woman has no say, has partial say, and is the sole decision maker (Section 4). One might
6 Ideally, we would re-estimate the effects for twin sisters. However, doing so reduces the sample size
significantly to less than 50 observations.
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concern that this type of construction entails the measurement error problem since these
variables do not account for the issue that the interpretation of partial involvement varies
across and within countries with different degrees of gender preferences (Acosta et al., 2020).
For instance, while some women actually make the final decision with their husbands/partners,
other women might only have some say but the final decision is left to men.
To address this issue, we recode our decision items by assigning the value of 1 if the woman
is the sole decision maker and 0 otherwise. The results are reported in Table 5. We still
find positive and statistically significant impacts of education on women’s intra-household
decision making. In other words, the estimates in Table 5 are close to those in Table 2 in
both economic and statistical sense, lending further support to our estimated impacts of
education on women’s intra-household decision making.
Robustness Checks 3: Different Specifications − In the third set of exercises, we
re-estimate the impacts of education using different specifications. The results are provided
in Table 6. As shown in Panel A, using sample weight leaves our main results unchanged.
Particularly, an additional year of education increases women’s intra-household decision
making power in both financial and non-financial dimensions. While more educated women
are no less likely to suffer from physical violence, they tend to experience less psychological
abuse. In Panel B, excluding all control variables leaves our estimates intact. In Panel C,
we control for birth order of the woman because birth order is a good proxy for parental
investment which could potentially affect education and empowerment measures (Price, 2008;
Lehmann et al., 2016; Le and Nguyen, 2020b). With the inclusion of birth order, we still
uncover positive impacts of education on women’s intra-household decision making power
and negative impacts on the incidence of psychological abuse.
From Panels D through F, we control for husband/partner’s education, women’s marital
status, and women’s religion.7 It is possible that these factors might exert some degree of
influence on women’s relational empowerment. As shown in Columns 1 and 2 of these panels,
the effects of education on women’s intra-household decision making power are preserved in
both economic and statistical sense. There is still a lack of evidence for the effects of female
education on the incidence of physical violence. As for psychological abuse, the impacts of
female education are insensitive to the inclusion of marital status and religion. However,
7 We do not include these variables as regressors in our main model because they could be affected by female
education, which makes them potentially endogenous.
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the point estimate becomes statistically indistinguishable from zero once husband/partner’s
education is accounted for. As the educational level of the woman affects the education
of her husband/partner (i.e. assortative matching, Section 5.3), the impacts of education
on the experience of psychological abuse could potentially be transmitted through her
husband/partner’s education.
Taken together, the results of the robustness exercises further support the internal validity of
our estimated impacts of education on women’s relational empowerment.
Table 6: Robustness Checks 3: Different Specifications
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Financial Non-financial Physical Psychological
Decisions Decisions Violence Abuse
Panel A: Using Sample Weight
Female Education 0.009∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ -0.000 -0.014∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Observations 23,889 20,032 6,050 5,117
Panel B: No Control Variables
Female Education 0.009∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ -0.004 -0.008∗∗
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Observations 23,894 20,037 6,052 5,119
Panel C: Control for Birth Order
Female Education 0.009∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ -0.004 -0.009∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Observations 23,894 20,037 6,052 5,119
Panel D: Control for Husband/Partner’s Education
Female Education 0.007∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ -0.001 0.004
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.006)
Observations 16,745 14,449 4,869 3,963
Panel E: Control for Marital Status
Female Education 0.009∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ -0.004 -0.009∗∗
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004)
Observations 23,894 20,037 6,052 5,119
Panel F: Control for Religion
Female Education 0.006∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ -0.001 -0.107∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.000)
Observations 14,675 12,063 3,069 2,980
NOTE: Each cell reports the coefficient β1 in equation (2). All regressions except those in Panel B
control for age, the age difference between the woman and her sister, sister fixed effects, as well as
the country-specific birth cohort trend.The panel headings indicate the types of robustness exercises.
Standard errors are provided in the parentheses. ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
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5.3 Potential Mechanisms
In this section, we provide some suggestive evidence on the potential pathways to the
effects of female education. We focus on three main groups of mechanisms through which
female schooling could potentially empower women: (i) access to information, (ii) assortative
matching, and (iii) labor market outcome. First, education equips women with a new stock
of knowledge, which enables them to process information and formulates their behaviors in
interacting with others (Duflo, 2012; Samarakoon and Parinduri, 2015). As a result, access
to information can empower women by increasing their role in household decision making
and reducing the acceptance of domestic violence (Mahmud et al., 2012; Friedman et al.,
2016). Second, as better-educated women tend to marry better-educated men (Siow, 2015)
and well-educated men are less likely to exercise violence against their wives (Simister and
Makowiec, 2008), assortative matching could be another channel transmitting the effects of
female education.
Table 7: Potential Mechanisms
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Access to Information
Watch Television Read Magazines Listen to Radio
Female Education 0.021∗∗∗ 0.084∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
Observations 17,443 17,423 17,432
Panel B: Assortative Matching
Husband/Partner Education
Female Education 0.349∗∗∗
(0.023)
Observations 16,746
Panel C: Labor Market Outcome
Currently Working Worked in the Earnings
Last 12 Months
Female Education 0.015∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
Observations 23,787 23,795 2,253
NOTE: Each cell reports the coefficient β1 in equation (2). All regressions control for age, the age
difference between the woman and her sister, sister fixed effects, as well as the country-specific birth
cohort trend. Standard errors are provided in the parentheses. ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
Third, previous studies suggest that education improves women’s labor market outcome
(Cameron et al., 2001; Aslam et al., 2008; Chamlou et al., 2016). The resulting improvements
in women’s economic status can exert positive influence on their intra-household decision
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making authority (Attanasio and Lechene, 2002; Morozumi, 2012; Antman, 2014; Heath and
Tan, 2019). Specifically, engagement in market work makes women more likely to be involved
in household decisions (Antman, 2014). Furthermore, as women’s relative income share is
positively correlated with their intra-household bargaining power, higher earnings induce
women to have a say in important decisions within the households (Attanasio and Lechene,
2002; Iyigun and Walsh, 2007). Besides, better employment opportunities and higher incomes
tend to decrease women’s exposure to intimate partner violence (Aizer, 2010; Hidrobo and
Fernald, 2013). Thus, labor market outcome could be one channel through which education
empowers women.
We measure access to information by three variables indicating the frequency of women
watching television (Watch Television), reading magazines (Read Magazines), and listening to
the radio (Listen to Radio).8 Assortative matching is captured by the educational attainment
of the husband/partner. Female labor market outcome is proxied by a dummy variable that
takes the value of 1 if the woman is currently working and 0 otherwise (Currently Working), a
dummy that takes the value of 1 if the woman worked in the last 12 months and 0 otherwise
(Worked in the Last 12 Months), and her annual labor earnings (Earnings). We estimate
the same specification as in equation (2) but replace empowerment measures with potential
mechanism variables.
The estimating results are provided in Table 7. It is evident from Panel A that education
makes it more likely for women to get access to information by raising the frequency of
watching television, reading magazines, and listening to the radio. From Panel B, there is
evidence that female education is positively related to husband/partner education. As shown
in Panel C, there is a positive association between education and women’s probability of
participating in the labor market, both at the time being and within the last 12 months.
The effect on earnings is also positive and statistically significant. Collectively, the impacts
of education on women’s empowerment in terms of higher intra-household decision making
power and less relational friction could be, at least in part, attributed to the increased access
to information, assortative matching, and the improvements in labor market outcome.
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Table 8: Heterogeneity Analyses
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Financial Non-financial Physical Psychological
Decisions Decisions Violence Abuse
Panel A: African Women
Female Education 0.009∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.003 -0.001
(0.002) (0.003) (0.079) (0.261)
Observations 11,677 9,523 2,147 2,064
Panel B: Non-African Women
Female Education 0.010∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ -0.003 -0.009
(0.002) (0.002) (0.009) (0.024)
Observations 12,217 10,514 3,905 3,055
Panel C: Rural Women
Female Education 0.008∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.000 0.010
(0.003) (0.003) (0.007) (0.099)
Observations 8,859 7,668 2,111 1,896
Panel D: Urban Women
Female Education 0.010∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ -0.004 -0.012∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004)
Observations 13,618 11,374 3,721 3,017
Panel E: Married Women
Female Education 0.005∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ -0.009 -0.058
(0.002) (0.003) (0.024) (0.064)
Observations 9,434 8,663 1,687 1,579
Panel F: Unmarried Women
Female Education 0.012∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ -0.000 -0.003
(0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Observations 14,460 11,374 4,365 3,540
NOTE: Each cell reports the coefficient β1 in equation (2). The panel headings indicate dimensions
of heterogeneity. All regressions control for age, the age difference between the woman and her sister,
sister fixed effects, as well as the country-specific birth cohort trend. Standard errors are provided in the
parentheses. ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
5.4 Heterogeneity Analyses
In this section, we proceed to test for the heterogeneous impacts of female education along
the lines of continent, place of residence, and marital status. The results are reported in
Table 8. In Panels A and B, we examine if the effects differ between African and non-African
women. The results point to similar returns to education in terms of relational empowerment
measures for both African and non-African women. In Panels C and D, we explore the
8 The range of these variables is as follows: 0-“not at all”, 1-“less than once a week”, 2-“at least once a
week”, 3-“almost every day”.
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heterogeneity along the place of residence dimension. Regarding intra-household decision
making power, we detect similar estimates for rural and urban women. While urban women
experience improvements in relational friction, rural women do not. Particularly, education
has a negative and statistically significant effect on the psychological abuse index for urban
women whereas the point estimate for rural women is statistically indistinguishable from
zero.
In Panels E and F, we explore if there is any heterogeneity in the effects of education among
married and unmarried women. While there is not enough evidence for the impacts on
relational friction, education does raise the intra-household decision making authority for
both married and unmarried women. In terms of magnitude, we detect slightly larger effects
among unmarried women.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we estimate the impacts of education on women’s relational empowerment
depicted by intra-household decision making and relational friction for a sample covering 70
developing countries. Drawing from the Demographic and Health Surveys, we identify the
effects of interest by comparing the empowerment measures of biological sisters who differ in
educational attainment, within a sister fixed effects framework.
We find that education improves women’s decision making authority within the households
in both financial and non-financial domains. The findings are in line with Manser and
Brown (1980)’s bargaining theory, supported by several subsequent studies (Lundberg and
Pollak, 1993; Chiappori et al., 2009; Duflo, 2012). Moreover, our results point to the
negative impacts of female education on relational friction measured by women’s exposure
to psychological abuse. Our findings complement the literature on the relationship between
female education and domestic violence (Eswaran and Malhotra, 2011; Anderberg et al.,
2016; Erten and Keskin, 2018). We further explore the pathways to the impacts of female
education. Education empowers women through increased access to information, assortative
matching, and improved labor market outcome. Given the integral role of women in all
17 SDGs (UN Women, 2018), our results highlight the importance of female education in
achieving sustainable development. Expanding access to education for women not only help
materialize SDG-5 (Gender Equality) but also contribute to the progress in other goals.
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Appendix A
Table A1: Correlation Test
(1) (2) (3)
Deviation of Female Education
from Pair Mean
Birth Order -0.250
(0.394)
City as Childhood Place of Residence -0.380
(0.674)
Marriage to First Birth of Interval (months) -0.005
(0.006)
Observations 23,901 23,901 16,933
NOTE: Dependent variable is the deviation from (sister) pair mean of the woman’s years of education.
Explanatory variables are the deviation from (sister) pair mean of the woman’s prior characteristics.
These characteristics include birth order, childhood place of residence (an indicator for a city), and the
time interval between marriage and first birth. All regressions control for statistical area-by-wave-by-birth
year fixed effects. Standard errors are provided in the parentheses. ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
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Table A2: Additional Heterogeneity Analyses
(1) (2)
Own Husband/Partner
Earnings Earnings
Panel A: African Women
Female Education 0.003 0.006
(0.003) (0.005)
Observations 6,594 4,567
Panel B: Non-African Women
Female Education -0.001 -0.004
(0.003) (0.006)
Observations 6,823 5,501
Panel C: Rural Women
Female Education 0.002 0.001
(0.006) (0.006)
Observations 4,360 4,446
Panel D: Urban Women
Female Education 0.002 0.000
(0.002) (0.007)
Observations 8,211 4,953
Panel E: Married Women
Female Education 0.004 0.003
(0.004) (0.002)
Observations 5,038 6,714
Panel F: Unmarried Women
Female Education 0.001 0.004
(0.002) (0.007)
Observations 8,379 3,354
Panel G: Employed Women
Female Education 0.002 0.002
(0.002) (0.005)
Observations 11,365 5,283
Panel H: Unemployed Women
Female Education 0.006 -0.001
(0.005) (0.009)
Observations 1,978 4,768
NOTE: Each cell reports the coefficient β1 in equation (2). The panel headings indicate dimensions
of heterogeneity. All regressions control for age, the age difference between the woman and her sister,
sister fixed effects, as well as the country-specific birth cohort trend. Standard errors are provided in the
parentheses. ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
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Appendix B
Table B1: The List of Countries
Code Name Survey Year and Wave Avg. Education Avg. Age
AL Albania [09]5, [17]7 11.3 27.8
AO Angola [15,16]7 6.7 25.433
AM Armenia [00, 05]4, [10]6, [16]7 10.593 30.093
AZ Azerbaijan [06]5 10.0 27.963
BD Bangladesh [93, 94, 96, 97]3, [04]4, [07]5, [11, 14]6 5.2 27.056
BJ Benin [96]3, [01]4, [06]5, [11, 12]6, [17, 18]7 4.920 27.095
BO Bolivia [93, 94, 98]3, [03, 04]4, [08]5 10.441 25.471
BR Brazil [96]3 6.635 25.442
BF Burkina Faso [03]4, [10]6 5.558 26.236
BU Burundi [10, 11]6, [16, 17]6 5.354 25.539
KH Cambodia [00]4, [05, 06, 10, 11]5, [14]6 5.503 27.716
CM Cameroon [04]4, [11]6 7.590 28.536
CF Central African Republic [94, 95]3 3.610 27.992
TD Chad [96, 97]3, [04]4, [14, 15]6 2.145 28.443
CO Colombia [95]3, [00, 04, 05]4, [09, 10]5, [15, 16]7 9.245 26.958
KM Comoros [96]3, [12]6 6.364 25.921
CG Congo [05]5, [11, 12]6 7.537 27.983
CD Congo Democratic Republic [07]5, [13, 14]6 7.743 27.595
CI Cote d’Ivoire [11, 12]6 4.100 28.866
DR Dominican Republic [96, 99]3, [02]4, [07]5, [13]6 9.783 26.926
EG Egypt [95]3, [00, 05]4, [08]5, [14]6 6.624 31
ET Ethiopia [92, 97]4, [03]6, [08]7 5.353 25.460
GA Gabon 00, 01, 12 7.533 27.459
GM Gambia [13]6 7.989 27.240
GH Ghana [93, 98]3, [03]4, [08]5, [14]6 7.574 25.896
GU Guatemala [95, 98, 99]3, [14, 15]6 6.564 25.794
GN Guinea [05]4, [12]6 5.246 27.616
GY Guyana [09]5 10.905 27.551
HT Haiti [00]4, [05, 06]5, [12]6, [16, 17]7 6.378 27.248
HN Honduras [05, 06]5, [11, 12]6 7.735 25.813
IA India [98, 99]3, [05, 06]5, [15, 16]6 7.677 26.569
ID Indonesia [94, 97]3, [02, 03]4, [07]5, [12]6, [17]7 10.152 29.693
JO Jordan [02]4, [07]5, [12]6, [17, 18]7 9.7 31.44
KK Kazakhstan [95, 99]3 10.5 25.214
KE Kenya [98]3, [03]4, [08, 09]5, [14]6 8.427 25.509
KY Kyrgyz Republic [97]3, [12]6 11.7 27.234
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Code Name Survey Year and Wave Avg. Education Avg. Age
LS Lesotho [04, 05]4, [09, 10]5, [14]6 8.442 25.79
LB Liberia [06, 07]5, [13]6 5.531 27.609
MD Madagascar [97]3, [03, 04]4, [08, 09]5 5.237 26.065
MW Malawi [00, 04, 05]4, [10]5, [15, 16]7 7.1 25.706
MV Maldives [09]5, [16, 17]7 8.851 29.089
ML Mali [95, 96]3, [01]4, [06]5, [12, 13]6, [18]7 3.261 27.389
MB Moldova [05]4 10.846 22.577
MA Morocco [03, 04]4 5.133 28.523
MZ Mozambique [97]3, [03]4, [11, 15]6 5.902 26.595
MM Myanmar [15, 16]7 6.255 32.26
NM Namibia [00]4, [06, 07]5, [13]6 8.215 27.817
NP Nepal [96]3, [01]4, [06]5, [11]6, [16]7 6.004 25.140
NC Nicaragua [97, 98]3, [01]4 7.381 26.129
NI Niger [98]3, [06]5, [12]6 3.755 27.545
NG Nigeria [03]4, [08]5, [13]6 9.482 26.168
PK Pakistan [12, 13]6, [17, 18]7 3.417 29.667
PE Peru [96]3, [00]4, [03-12]5 [09-12]6 10.703 26.921
PH Philippines [98]3, [03]4, [08]5, [13]6, [17]7 11.351 27.593
RW Rwanda [00, 05]4, [10, 11, 14, 15]6 5.061 26.98
ST Sao Tome and Principe [08]5 6.186 26.644
SN Senegal [05]4, [10-13, 15]6, [17]7 4.70 28.576
SL Sierra Leone [08]5, [13]6 5.36 27.771
ZA South Africa [98]3, [16]7 9.789 27.420
SZ Swaziland [06, 07]5 9.014 24.958
TJ Tajikistan [12]6, [17]7 9.595 27.812
TZ Tanzania [96]3, [04, 05]4, [09, 10]5, [15, 16]7 6.743 26.962
TL Timor-Leste [09, 10]5, [16]17 9.468 26.268
TG Togo [98]3, [13, 14]6 5.994 26.959
TR Turkey [98]3, [03, 04]4 5.176 26.235
UG Uganda [95]3, [00, 01]4, [06]5, [11]5, [16]7 7.144 26.852
UA Ukraine [07]5 12.706 25.647
UZ Yemen [96]3 10.632 27.211
ZM Zambia [96]3, [01, 02]4, [07]5, [13, 14]6 7.471 26.701
ZW Zimbabwe [94]3, [99]4, [05, 06]5, [10, 11]6, [15]7 9.336 26.425
NOTE: Column 1 and 2 display country code and name. Column 3 shows [survey year]survey wave. For
example, [99, 01-0.3]4 means that the respondents of survey wave 4 in the sample are interviewed in
1999, 2001, 2002, and 2003. Besides, Columns 4 and 5 also provide the average years of education and
age for the sampled women.
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Table B2: Additional Summary Statistics
Mean
(SD)
Intra-household Decision Making Relational Friction
Large Purchases 0.411 Being Pushed 0.241
(0.404) (0.428)
Daily Purchases 0.454 Being Slapped 0.257
(0.444) (0.437)
Own Earnings 0.861 Being Punched 0.118
(0.286) (0.323)
Husband/Partner Earnings 0.411 Being Kicked 0.123
(0.360) (0.328)
Women’s Health Care 0.584 Being Strangled 0.052
(0.431) (0.221)
Food Cooked 0.455 Being Twisted 0.091
(0.444) (0.287)
Family Visits 0.546 Being Humiliated 0.17
(0.407) (0.383)
Being Threatened with Harm 0.110
(0.313)
Being Insulted 0.226
(0.418)
NOTE: The seven items that constitute the intra-household decision making indices include Large
Purchases, Daily Purchases, Own Earnings, Husband/Partner Earnings, Women’s Health Care, Food
Cooked, Family Visits. Each takes the value of 1 if the woman is the sole decision maker, 0.5 if she is
partially involved in the decision, 0 if she has no say in the decision. The items that form the relational
friction indices include Being Pushed, Being Slapped, Being Punched, Being Kicked, Being Strangled,
Being Twisted Being Humiliated, Being Threatened with Harm, and Being Insulted. Each is a dummy
indicating whether the husband/partner ever uses a particular type of violence against his wife.
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